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Achieving Efficiency in Dynamic Contribution Games†
By Jakša Cvitanic´ and George Georgiadis*
We analyze a game in which a group of agents exerts costly effort over 
time to make progress on a project. The project is completed once the 
cumulative effort reaches a prespecified threshold, at which point 
it generates a lump-sum payoff. We characterize a budget-balanced 
mechanism that induces each agent to exert the first-best effort level 
as the outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium, thus eliminating 
the free-rider problem. We also show how our mechanism can be 
adapted to other dynamic games with externalities, such as strategic 
experimentation and the dynamic extraction of a common resource. (JEL C73, D62, D82, Q31)
Team problems are ubiquitous in modern economies as individuals and firms often need to collaborate in production and service provision (Ichniowski and 
Shaw 2003). Moreover, the collaboration is often geared towards achieving a partic-
ular set of objectives, i.e., towards completing a project (Harvard Business Review 
2004). For example, in early-stage entrepreneurial ventures (e.g., startups), individ-
uals collaborate over time to create value, and the firm generates a payoff predom-
inantly when it goes public or is acquired by another corporation. Joint research 
and development and new product development projects also share many of these 
characteristics: corporations work together to achieve a common goal, progress is 
gradual, and the payoff from the collaboration is harvested primarily after said goal 
is achieved, for example, once a patent is secured, or the product under development 
is released to the market. Unfortunately, as it is well known, such environments are 
susceptible to the free-rider problem (Olson 1965, Alchian and Demsetz 1972).
We study a game of dynamic contributions to a joint project (Admati and Perry 
1991), which can be summarized as follows: At every moment each agent in the 
group chooses his (costly) effort level to progressively bring the project closer to 
completion. The agents receive a lump-sum payoff upon completion, and they dis-
count time. An equilibrium feature of this game is that the agents exert greater effort 
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the closer the project is to completion. Therefore, by raising his effort, an agent can 
induce the others to raise their future efforts, which renders him better off; thus, 
efforts are strategic complements across time (Kessing 2007). By comparing the 
equilibrium strategies with the efficient ones, we identify two kinds of inefficien-
cies. First, because each agent is incentivized by his share of the project’s pay-
off (rather than the entire payoff), in equilibrium he exerts inefficiently low effort. 
Second, because efforts are strategic complements, each agent front-loads his effort 
in order to induce others to raise their future efforts. The former has been exten-
sively discussed in the literature, but the latter, while subtle, is also intuitive. For 
instance, startups often use vesting schemes to disincentivize entrepreneurs from 
front-loading effort, i.e., working hard early on and then walking away while retain-
ing their stake in the firm. 
We propose a budget-balanced mechanism that induces each agent to exert the 
efficient level of effort as the outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium (MPE). The 
mechanism specifies for each agent flow payments that are due while the project is in 
progress and a reward that is disbursed upon completion. These payments are placed 
in a savings account that accumulates interest. The mechanism effectively rewards 
each agent with the entire payoff that the project generates, thus making him the full 
residual claimant, while the flow payments increase with progress so that the mar-
ginal benefit from front-loading effort is exactly offset by the marginal cost associ-
ated with larger flow payments in the future. The idea behind our mechanism can be 
viewed as a dynamic counterpart of the budget breaker in Holmström (1982), except 
that the savings account plays the role of the budget breaker in our setting. 
Our mechanism resembles many of the features in the incentives structures com-
monly observed in startups. In particular, entrepreneurs usually receive a salary that 
is below the market rate (if any). The flow payments in our mechanism can be 
interpreted as the difference between what an individual earns in the startup and 
his outside option, i.e., what he would earn if he were to seek employment in the 
market. Finally, entrepreneurs typically own shares, so they are residual claimants. 
Alternatively, the flow payments can be interpreted as the cash investments that the 
entrepreneurs need to make in the project until they can raise capital. Based on the 
latter interpretation, our mechanism is resource feasible provided that the agents 
have sufficient cash reserves at the outset of the game to make the specified flow 
payments. 
To distill the intuition, we start with the simplest possible framework, in which 
the project progresses deterministically, and the mechanism depends on the state of 
the project, but not on time. We later extend our model to incorporate uncertainty 
in the evolution of the project, and we characterize the efficient time-dependent 
mechanism. In this case, flow payments are specified as a function of both time and 
the state of the project, and terminal rewards as a function of the completion time. 
This mechanism specifies a terminal reward that decreases in the completion time 
of the project, and at every moment the flow payments are chosen so as to penalize 
the agents if the project is closer to completion than it should be on expectation if 
all agents were applying the first-best strategies. Intuitively, the former acts as a 
lever to mitigate the agents’ incentives to shirk, while the latter as a lever to elim-
inate their incentives to front-load effort. An important difference relative to the 
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deterministic mechanism is that with uncertainty, it is impossible to simultaneously 
achieve efficiency and ex post budget balance; instead, the efficient mechanism can 
only be budget balanced ex ante (i.e., in expectation). Finally, in the special case in 
which the project progresses deterministically, the efficient time-dependent mecha-
nism specifies that the agents make zero flow payments on the equilibrium path (but 
positive off path), and as such, it is resource feasible even if the agents are credit 
constrained.
While we develop our mechanism in the context of dynamic contribution games, 
our mechanism can be readily adapted to other dynamic games with externalities. 
To illustrate the versatility of our framework, we consider two common dynamic 
games: first, a dynamic common resource extraction problem such as the one stud-
ied by Levhari and Mirman (1980) and Reinganum and Stokey (1985), and sec-
ond, a strategic experimentation problem similar to that in Keller, Rady, and Cripps 
(2005) and Bonatti and Hörner (2011). In each case, we construct a mechanism 
that induces the agents to always choose the efficient actions as the outcome of an 
MPE. For the resource extraction problem, the mechanism specifies that each agent 
receives a flow subsidy that decreases as the resource becomes more scarce to neu-
tralize his incentives to overharvest it. To achieve budget balance, each agent must 
pay a combination of an entry fee in exchange for access to the resource and a pen-
alty fee that becomes due as soon as it is depleted. Similarly for the experimentation 
problem, the mechanism specifies that each agent pays a fee to enter the mechanism 
and receives a subsidy that is a function of the (public) belief about the risky project 
being lucrative.
Naturally, our paper is related to the literature on the static moral hazard in 
teams (Olson 1965; Holmström 1982; Ma, Moore, and Turnbull 1988; Bagnoli and 
Lipman 1989; Legros and Matthews 1993; and others). These papers focus on the 
free-rider problem that arises when each agent must share the output of his effort 
with other members of the team, but he alone bears its cost, and they explore ways 
to restore efficiency. Holmström (1982) shows that in a setting wherein a group 
of agents jointly produce output, there exists no budget-balanced sharing rule that 
induces the agents to choose efficient actions. Moreover, he shows how efficiency 
is attainable by introducing a third party who makes each agent the full residual 
claimant of output and breaks the budget using transfers that are independent of 
output. Legros and Matthews (1993) provide a necessary and sufficient condition 
for the existence of a sharing rule such that the team sustains efficiency. Their con-
struction uses mixed strategies where all agents but one choose the efficient actions, 
and the last agent chooses the efficient action with probability close to  1 . However, 
a necessary condition for this mechanism to sustain efficiency is that the agents have 
unlimited liability. 
More closely related to this paper is the literature on dynamic contribution games. 
Admati and Perry (1991) characterize an MPE with two players, and they show that 
efforts are inefficiently low relative to the efficient outcome. Marx and Matthews 
(2000) generalize this result to games with  n players, and they also characterize 
subgame perfect equilibria with non-Markov strategies. More recently, Yildirim 
(2006) and Kessing (2007) show that if the project generates a payoff only upon 
completion, then efforts become strategic complements across time. Our model is 
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a generalized version of Georgiadis, Lippman, and Tang (2014) who consider the 
problem faced by a project manager who chooses the size of the project to be under-
taken and has limited ability to commit to the project requirements at the outset 
of the game. Georgiadis (2015a) studies how the size of the group influences the 
agents’ incentives and analyzes the problem faced by a principal who chooses the 
group size and the agents’ incentive contracts to maximize her discounted profit. 
Last, Georgiadis (2015b) examines how commitment to a deadline and altering the 
monitoring structure in this class of games can mitigate the agents’ incentives to 
free ride. In contrast to these papers, which highlight the inefficiencies that arise in 
these games and explore the differences to their static counterparts, our objective is 
to construct a mechanism that restores efficiency. 
Our work is also related to a recent strand of the dynamic mechanism design 
literature that extends the Vickrey–Clarke–Groves and d’Aspremont–Gerard-Varet 
mechanisms to dynamic environments. Bergemann and Välimäki (2010) and Athey 
and Segal (2013) consider a dynamic model where in every period each agent obtains 
private information, and a social planner seeks to make allocation decisions based 
on the information that the agents report. After showing that a static mechanism can-
not restore efficiency in this dynamic environment, they construct mechanisms that 
induce the agents to report truthfully and implement the efficient allocations after 
every history. The former paper focuses on the mechanism being  self-enforcing, 
while the latter focuses on the mechanism being budget-balanced after every period. 
While these papers focus on environments with private information only, in an ear-
lier working paper, Athey and Segal (2007) also incorporate moral hazard in the 
dynamic mechanism. The basic idea behind these mechanisms is that they make 
each agent a full residual claimant of total surplus, so the agent internalizes his 
externality on the other agents, which in turn induces him to report truthfully as long 
as the mechanism prescribes an efficient allocation rule. Our contribution relative to 
these papers is twofold. First, we focus on particular applications, which enables us 
to generate economic insights about the properties of the efficient mechanism in the 
context of those applications. Second, we extend the analysis to characterize mech-
anisms that condition on time in addition to the main state variable (e.g., progress 
on the project). This makes it possible to achieve efficiency even if the agents face 
tighter cash constraints. 
Finally, there is a growing literature on contracting for experimentation such as 
Bergemann and Hege (2005); Bonatti and Hörner (2011); Halac, Kartik, and Liu 
(2015); Moroni (2014); and others. These papers consider a principal-agent prob-
lem in which the agents participate in a strategic experimentation game, and they 
characterize the optimal contract. In extending our model to dynamic experimenta-
tion problems, we approach this problem from a different perspective by character-
izing a mechanism that induces the agents to always choose the efficient actions as 
part of an MPE. A secondary difference is that these papers typically assume that 
experimentation costs are linear and symmetric across the agents, whereas we allow 
for more general, asymmetric cost structures. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. We present the model in 
Section I; in Section II we characterize the MPE, as well as the efficient outcome of 
this game. In Section III, we present our main result: a  budget-balanced  mechanism 
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that achieves efficiency as the outcome of an MPE. In Section IV, we extend our 
model to incorporate uncertainty, and we characterize the efficient ( time-dependent) 
mechanism. In Section V, we adapt our mechanism to other dynamic games with 
externalities; and in Section VI, we conclude. All proofs are provided in the 
Appendix.
I. Model
A group of  n agents collaborate to complete a project. Time  t ∈  [0, ∞) is con-
tinuous. The project starts at initial state  q 0 = 0 , its state  q t evolves at a rate that 
depends on the agents’ instantaneous effort levels, and it is completed at the first time 
τ such that  q t hits the completion state, denoted by  Q .1 Each agent  i is risk-neutral, 
discounts time at rate  r > 0 , has cash reserves  w i ≥ 0 at the outset of the game, and 
receives a prespecified reward  v i =  α i v > 0 upon completing the project, where ∑ i=1 n α i = 1 .2 An incomplete project has zero value. At every moment  t each agent 
i observes the state of the project  q t and privately chooses his effort level  a i, t ≥ 0 , at 
flow cost  c i ( a i, t ) , to influence the process
  d q t =  ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i, t ) dt. 3
We assume that each agent’s effort choice is not observable to the other agents, 
and  c i (·) is a strictly increasing, strictly convex, differentiable function satisfying 
 c i ′′′ (a) ≥ 0 for all  a ,  c i (0) =  c i ′(0) = 0 and  lim a→∞  c i ′(a) = ∞ for all  i . Finally, 
we shall restrict attention to Markov perfect equilibria—henceforth, MPE—where 
at every moment each agent observes the current state of the project  q t and chooses 
his effort level as a function of  q t , but not its entire evolution path  { q s } s≤t .4
II. Equilibrium Analysis
For benchmarking purposes, in this section we characterize the MPE of this game 
without a mechanism in place, as well as the first-best outcome, i.e., the problem 
faced by a social planner who chooses the agents’ strategies to maximize their total 
discounted payoff. Finally, we compare the MPE and the first-best outcome of the 
game to pinpoint the inefficiencies that arise in equilibrium.
1 For simplicity, we assume that the completion state is specified exogenously. It is straightforward to extend the 
model to allow for endogenous project size and to show that all results carry over. 
2 Note that  v can be interpreted as the expected value of the project’s random reward. We assume that the project 
generates a payoff only upon completion. It is straightforward to extend the model to the case in which the project 
also generates flow payoffs while it is in progress. 
3 We assume that the project progresses deterministically in the base model, because this makes it easier to illus-
trate the counteracting economic forces and to exposit the intuitions. We extend our model to incorporate stochastic 
progress in Section IV. 
4 We focus on the MPE, because it requires minimal coordination among the agents, and it constitutes the 
worst-case scenario in terms of the severity of the free-rider problem. As shown by Georgiadis, Lippman, and Tang 
(2014), this game has a continuum of non-Markovian equilibria that yield the agents a higher discounted payoff 
than the MPE. 
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A. Markov Perfect Equilibrium
In an MPE, at every moment  t each agent  i observes the state of the project  q t 
and chooses his effort  a i ( q t ) as a function of  q t to maximize his discounted payoff 
while accounting for the effort strategies of the other group members  { a j ( q t ) } j≠i . 
For a given set of strategies and a given initial value  q t = q , agent  i ’s value function 
satisfies
(1)  J i (q) =  e −r  (τ−t)  α i v −  ∫ t τ e −r  (s−t)  c i ( a i ( q s ) ) ds,  
where  τ denotes the completion time of the project. Using standard arguments, we 
expect that the function  J i (·) satisfies the Hamilton–Jacobi–Bellman (henceforth, 
HJB) equation:
(2)  r J i (q) =  max  a i    {− c i ( a i ) +  (  ∑ j=1
n
 a j )  J i ′(q) }  
defined on  [0,  Q] , subject to the boundary condition
(3)  J i (Q) =  α i v. 
The boundary condition states that upon completing the project, each agent receives 
his reward, and the game ends. 
Assuming that (2) holds for all agents, each agent observes the state  q , and chooses 
his effort to maximize the right side of (2) while accounting for his belief about 
the other agents’ strategies  { a j (q) } j≠i . The corresponding first-order condition is 
 c i ′( a i ) =  J i ′(q) : at every moment he chooses his effort level such that the marginal 
cost of effort is equal to the marginal benefit associated with bringing the proj-
ect closer to completion. By noting that the second-order condition is satisfied, 
 c′ (0) = 0 , and  c (·) is strictly convex, it follows that for any  q , agent  i ’s optimal 
effort level is  a i (q) =  f i ( J i ′(q) ) , where  f i (·) =  c i ′−1 (max {0, ·} ) . By substituting this 
into (2), the discounted payoff function of agent  i satisfies
(4)  r J i (q) = − c i ( f i ( J i ′(q) ) ) +  [  ∑ j=1
n
  f j ( J j ′(q) ) ]  J i ′(q)  
subject to the boundary condition (3). 
Thus, an MPE is characterized by the system of ordinary differential equations 
(henceforth, ODE) defined by (4) subject to the boundary condition (3) for all 
 i ∈  {1,  .. , n} , provided that this system admits a solution. The following proposition 
characterizes the unique project-completing MPE of this game and establishes its 
main properties.
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PROPOSITION 1: For  Q sufficiently small, the game defined by (2) subject to the 
boundary conditions (3) for all  i ∈  {1,  .. , n} has an MPE that is unique among those 
in which each agent’s discounted payoff is twice differentiable. The payoff is also 
strictly positive, strictly increasing, and strictly convex in  q on  [0, Q] , i.e.,  J i (q) > 0 , 
J i ′(q) > 0 , and  J i ′′ (q) > 0 . in particular, since each agent’s optimal effort  a i (q) =  f i ( J i ′(q)) , equilibrium effort is strictly increasing in  q .
The first part of this proposition asserts that if the project is not too long (i.e.,  Q 
is not too large), then the agents find it optimal to exert positive effort, in which case 
the project is completed in equilibrium. It is intuitive that  J i (·) is strictly increasing: 
each agent is better off the closer the project is to completion. That each agent’s 
effort level increases with progress is also intuitive: since he incurs the cost of effort 
at the time effort is exerted but is only compensated upon completion of the project, 
his incentives are stronger the closer the project is to completion. An implication of 
this last result is that efforts are strategic complements across time. That is because 
by raising his effort an agent brings the project closer to completion, thus incentiv-
izing agents to raise their future efforts (Kessing 2007). 
It is noteworthy that the MPE need not be unique in this game. Unless the project 
is sufficiently short (i.e.,  Q is sufficiently small) such that at least one agent is will-
ing to undertake the project single-handedly, there exists another (Markov perfect) 
equilibrium in which no agent ever exerts any effort and the project is never com-
pleted. Finally, if the project is too long, then there exists no equilibrium in which 
any agent ever exerts positive effort.
B. First-Best outcome
In this section, we consider the problem faced by a social planner, who at every 
moment chooses the agents’ effort levels to maximize the group’s total discounted 
payoff. Denoting the planner’s discounted payoff function by  s 
–(q) , we expect that it 
satisfies the HJB equation
(5)  r s –(q) =  max  a 1 ,  .. ,  a n    {− ∑ i=1
n
 c i ( a i ) +  ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i )  s –′ (q) }  
defined on interval  [0,  Q] , subject to the boundary condition
(6)  s –(Q) = v. 
The first-order conditions for the planner’s problem are  c i ′( a i ) = s′ (q) for 
every  i : at every moment each agent’s effort is chosen such that the marginal cost of 
effort is equal to the group’s total marginal benefit of bringing the project closer to 
completion. Note the difference between the MPE and the first-best outcome: here, 
each agent trades off his marginal cost of effort and the marginal benefit of progress 
to the entire group, whereas in the MPE, he trades off his marginal cost of effort and 
his marginal benefit of progress, ignoring the (positive) externality of his effort on 
the other agents. 
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Denoting the first-best effort level of agent  i by  a –i (q) , we have  a –i (q) =  f i ( s –′ (q) ) , 
and by substituting the first-order condition into (5), it follows that the planner’s 
discounted payoff function satisfies
(7)  r s –(q) = − ∑ 
i=1
n
 c i ( f i ( s –′ (q) ) ) +  [ ∑ i=1
n
  f i ( s –′ (q) ) ]  s –′ (q)  
subject to the boundary condition (6). 
The following proposition characterizes the solution to the planner’s problem.
PROPOSITION 2: For  Q sufficiently small, the oDE defined by (5) subject to 
the boundary condition 6) has a unique solution on  [0,  Q] . on this interval, 
the planner’s discounted payoff is strictly positive, strictly increasing, twice 
differentiable, and strictly convex in  q , i.e.,  s 
–(q) > 0 ,  s –′ (q) > 0 , and  s –′′ (q) > 0 . 
since the efficient level of effort for each agent  a –i (q) =  f i ( s –′ (q) ) , effort is 
strictly increasing in  q .
Provided that the project is not too long (i.e.,  Q is not too large), it is socially effi-
cient to undertake and complete the project, whereas otherwise, the discounted cost 
to complete the project is less than the discounted reward that it generates, so it is 
efficient to not undertake it. The intuition for why each agent’s effort level increases 
with progress is similar to that in Proposition 1. Throughout the remainder of this 
paper, we shall assume that  Q is sufficiently small such that it is socially efficient to 
undertake the project.
Because the project progresses deterministically, it is possible to study the com-
pletion time of the project, which is also deterministic. A useful comparative static 
for the analysis that follows concerns how the completion time  τ depends on the 
group size  n .
Remark 1: Suppose that the agents are identical, i.e.,  c i (a) =  c j (a) for all  i,  j , and 
a . Then the completion time of the project in the first-best outcome  τ decreases in 
the group size  n .
Intuitively, because effort costs are convex, the larger the number of agents in the 
group, the faster they will complete the project in the first-best outcome. As shown 
in Georgiadis (2015a), this is generally not true in the MPE, where the completion 
time of the project decreases in  n if and only if the project is sufficiently long (i.e., 
Q is sufficiently large).
C. comparing the MPE and the First-Best outcome
Before we propose our mechanism, it is useful to pinpoint the inefficiencies that 
arise in this game when each agent chooses his effort to maximize his discounted 
payoff. To do so, we compare the solution to the planner’s problem with the MPE in 
the following proposition.
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PROPOSITION 3: suppose that the agents are symmetric (i.e.,  α i =  α j and 
 c i (a) =  c j (a) for all  i,  j , and  a ≥ 0 ). Then in the MPE characterized in Propo-
sition 1, each agent’s effort level  a i (q) ≤  a –i (q) for all  q , where  a –i (q) is the first-best 
effort level characterized in Proposition 2.
Intuitively, because each agent’s incentives are driven by the payoff that he receives 
upon completion of the project  α i v < v , whereas the social planner’s incentives are 
driven by the entire payoff that the project generates, in equilibrium, each agent 
exerts less effort relative to the first-best outcome, in the symmetric case. This result 
resembles the earlier results on free-riding in partnerships (e.g., Holmström 1982, 
Admati and Perry 1991, and others).5
It turns out that in this dynamic game, there is a second, more subtle source of 
inefficiency. Because this game exhibits positive externalities and efforts are stra-
tegic complements across time, each agent has an incentive to front-load his effort 
relative to the first best in order to induce the other agents to raise their effort, which 
in turn renders him better off.6 More precisely, we have
PROPOSITION 4: For each agent  i , the MPE discounted marginal cost of effort 
 e −rt c i ′( a i, t ) is decreasing in  t , while it is equal to zero in the socially efficient outcome.
Therefore, each agent’s discounted marginal cost of effort in the efficient out-
come is constant over time. This is intuitive: because effort costs are convex, effi-
ciency requires that the agents smooth their effort over time. On the other hand, 
in the MPE, each agent’s discounted marginal cost of effort decreases over time. 
Intuitively, because at every moment  t , each agent chooses his effort upon observing 
the state of the project  q t ; his equilibrium effort level increases in  q ; and he is better 
off the harder others work. Each agent has incentives to front-load his effort in order 
to induce others to raise their future efforts.
III. An Efficient Mechanism
In this section, we establish our main result: we construct a mechanism that 
induces each self-interested agent to always exert the efficient level of effort when 
playing an MPE. This mechanism specifies upfront payments that are due at the 
outset (which turn out to be  0 in the optimal mechanism), flow payments that each 
agent must pay while the project is in progress, which are a function of  q , and the 
reward that each agent receives upon completion of the project. We show that the 
mechanism is budget balanced on the equilibrium path, whereas off path, there may 
be a budget surplus, in which case money must be burned. However, the mechanism 
never results in a budget deficit.
5 If the agents are asymmetric, then we can only establish a weaker result. The proof shows that for every  q , 
there exists at least one agent  i such that his effort  a i (q) is no greater than his first-best effort  a –i (q) . 
6 Front-loading here refers to an agent’s discounted marginal cost of effort decreasing over time (and with prog-
ress), whereas efficiency requires that it be constant across time. 
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The timing of the game is as follows: First, a mechanism is proposed, which 
specifies an upfront payment  P i, 0 for each agent  i to be made before work com-
mences, and a schedule of flow payments  h i ( q t ) dt to be made during every interval (t,  t + dt) while the project is in progress. Then, each agent decides whether to 
accept or reject the mechanism. If all agents accept the mechanism, then each agent 
makes the upfront payment, and work commences. The upfront as well as the flow 
payments are placed in a savings account, which accumulates interest at rate  r . If a 
payment that is due is not made, then the group dissolves, and each agent receives 
payoff zero. 
An important remark is that if we interpret these flow payments as cash payments 
(as opposed to foregone salary, for example, as discussed in the introduction), then 
for this mechanism to be resource feasible, the agents must have sufficient cash 
reserves at the outset of the game (i.e., the  w i s must be sufficiently large). We begin 
in Section IIIA by assuming that  w i = ∞ for all  i (i.e., that the agents have unlim-
ited cash reserves), and we characterize a mechanism that implements the efficient 
outcome. In Section IIIB, we establish a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
mechanism to be resource feasible when the agents’ cash reserves are limited. In 
Section IV, we extend our model to incorporate uncertainty in the evolution of the 
project, and we consider a broader class of mechanisms, which depend on both time 
t and the state  q .7
A. unlimited cash reserves
incentivizing Efficient Actions.—Given a set of flow-payment functions  { h i (q) } 
i=1 
n
 , 
agent  i ’s discounted payoff function (excluding the upfront payments  P i, 0 ), which 
we denote by  J ˆi (q) , satisfies the HJB equation
(8)  r J ˆi (q) =  max  a i    {− c i ( a i ) +  (  ∑ j=1
n
 a j )  J ˆ i ′(q) −  h i (q) }  
on  [0,  Q] , subject to a boundary condition that remains to be determined. His 
 first-order condition is  c i ′( a i ) =  J ˆ i ′(q) , and because we want to induce each agent to 
exert the efficient effort level, we must have  c i ′( a i ) =  s –′ (q) , where  s –(·) is character-
ized in Proposition 2. Therefore,
  J ˆi (q) =  s –(q) −  p i , 
where  p i is a constant to be determined. Upon completion of the project, agent  i must 
receive
  J ˆi (Q) =  s –(Q) −  p i = v −  p i , 
7 In the deterministic case, we characterize a time-dependent mechanism that induces efficient incentives along 
the equilibrium path even if the agents have no cash reserves (i.e.,  w i = 0 for all  i ). 
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which gives us the boundary condition. Note that the upfront payments  { P i, 0 } 
i=1 n and 
the constants  { p i } i=1 n act as transfers, and we will choose them to minimize the total 
cash reserves needed to implement the mechanism, and to ensure that the mecha-
nism is budget balanced and the agents’ individual rationality constraints are satis-
fied (i.e., each agent’s ex ante discounted payoff is nonnegative). Using (7) and (8), 
we can solve for each agent’s flow-payment function that induces first-best effort:
(9)  h i (q) =  ∑ 
j≠i
   c j ( f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) + r p i . 
Based on this analysis, we can establish the following lemma.
LEMMA 1: suppose that all agents make flow payments that satisfy (9) and receive 
v −  p i upon completion of the project. Then:
 (i) There exists an MPE in which at every moment each agent exerts the efficient 
level of effort  a –i (q) as characterized in Proposition 2.
 (ii) The efficient flow-payment function satisfies  h i ′(q) > 0 for all  i and  q ∈ [0, Q] , 
i.e., the flow payments are strictly increasing in the state of the project.
To understand the intuition behind this construction, recall that the MPE charac-
terized in Section IIA is plagued by two sources of inefficiency: first, the agents have 
incentives to shirk by exerting inefficiently low effort, and second, they front-load 
their effort, i.e., their discounted marginal cost of effort decreases over time, whereas 
it is constant in the efficient outcome. Therefore, to induce agents to always exert 
the first-best effort, this mechanism must neutralize both sources of inefficiency. To 
eradicate the former, each agent is effectively made the full residual claimant of the 
project.8 To neutralize the latter, the flow payments increase with progress at a rate 
such that each agent’s benefit from front-loading effort is exactly offset by the cost 
associated with having to make larger flow payments in the future. 
By observing (9), we make the following remark regarding the total flow cost that 
each agent incurs while the project is in progress.
Remark 2: The flow cost that agent  i incurs given the state of the project  q is equal 
to
  c i (  f i ( s –′ (q) ) ) +  h i (q) =  ∑ 
j=1
n
 c j ( f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) + r  p i , 
i.e., it is the same across all agents and equal to the flow cost faced by the social 
planner (up to a constant).
8 Notice that each agent  i receives  v −  p i upon completion of the project, and his ad infinitum discounted cost 
of the state-independent flow payments in (9) is equal to  ∫ 0 ∞ e −rt r p i dt =  p i . Therefore, the net benefit to each agent 
from completing the project is equal to  (v − p i ) −  (− p i ) = v ; hence, he effectively becomes a residual claimant. 
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Intuitively, to induce efficient incentives, the flow-payment function for each 
agent  i must be chosen such that he faces the same flow cost (and reward upon 
completion) that the social planner faces in the original problem (up to a constant).
Budget Balance.—In this section, we characterize the payments  { P i, 0 } 
i=1 n and 
 { p i } i=1 n such that the mechanism is budget balanced while at the same time  minimizing 
the total discounted cost of the upfront and flow payments along the efficient effort 
path. 
We will say that a mechanism is budget balanced if the total sum of the dis-
counted payments is equal to the total reward generated by the project, i.e.,
  ∑ 
i=1
n
 [ P i, 0 +  ∫ 0 τ e −rs h i ( q s ) ds +  e −rτ (v −  p i ) ] =  e −rτ v. 
Before the agents begin working on the project, each agent  i ’s equilibrium dis-
counted payoff is equal to  J ˆi (0) −  P i, 0 =  s –(0) −  p i −  P i, 0 . Because each agent 
exerts the efficient effort level along the equilibrium path, the sum of the agents’ 
ex ante discounted payoffs (before any upfront payments) must equal  s –(0) . Therefore, 
budget balance requires that  n s 
–(0) −  ∑ i=1 n ( p i +  P i, 0 ) =  s –(0) , or equivalently, 
 ∑ i=1 n ( P i, 0 +  p i ) =  (n − 1)  s –(0) . Notice that the payments  { P i, 0 } 
i=1 n and  { p i } i=1 n are 
not determined uniquely.
The total discounted cost of the payments along the equilibrium path is equal to
  ∑ 
i=1
n
 [ P i, 0 +  ∫ 0  τ 
– e −rs (  ∑ j≠i c j ( f j ( s –′ ( q s ) ) ) + r p i ) ds] =  e −r τ – [ (n − 1) v −  ∑ i=1
n
 p i ] , 
where  τ – denotes the first-best completion time. A necessary condition for the mech-
anism to never be in deficit is  ∑ i=1 n P i, 0 ≥ 0 , so  ∑ i=1 n p i ≤  (n − 1)  s –(0) . Moreover, 
notice that the total discounted cost of the payments is minimized when
  ∑ 
i=1
n
 p i =  (n − 1)  s –(0)  and  P i, 0 = 0 ∀i. 
Accordingly, from now on, we set  P i, 0 = 0 , i.e., all upfront payments are set 
to  0 . Notice that the budget-balance constraint pins down only the sum  ∑ i=1 n p i , 
while the individual  p i s will depend on the way the agents decide to share the profits. 
Furthermore, observe from (9) that the sum of the agents’ flow payments is always 
nonnegative, which together with the above conditions implies that the mechanism 
is never in deficit along the equilibrium path.
So far, we have characterized a mechanism that induces each agent to exert the 
first-best effort at every moment while the project is in progress and that is budget 
balanced in equilibrium. However, a potential concern is that following a deviation, 
the total amount in the savings account upon completion of the project may be 
greater or less than  (n − 1)  [v −  s –(0) ] , in which case the mechanism will have 
a budget surplus or deficit, respectively. A desirable attribute is for the mechanism 
to always be budget balanced, so that the rewards that the agents receive upon 
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 completion of the project sum up to the balance in the savings account, both on and 
off the equilibrium path. To analyze this case, we let
(10)  H t =  ∑ 
i=1
n
  ∫ 
0
 t e r (t−s)  h i ( q s ) ds 
denote the balance in the savings account at time  t . We say that the mechanism is 
strictly budget balanced if the sum of the agents’ rewards upon completion of the 
project (at time  τ ) is equal to  v +  H τ . We assume that each agent  i is  promised 
reward  β i (v +  H τ ) upon completion of the project, where  β i ∈  [0, 1] for all  i and ∑ i=1 n β i = 1 . The following lemma shows that there exists no efficient, strictly 
 budget-balanced mechanism.
LEMMA 2: suppose that each agent  i receives  β i (v +  H τ ) upon completion, where 
β i ∈  [0, 1] for all  i and  ∑ i=1 n β i = 1 . Then there exist no flow-payment functions 
h i (·) that lead to the efficient outcome in an MPE. in particular, the maximal social 
welfare of the strictly budget-balanced game is equal to the maximal social welfare 
of a game in which each player  i is promised reward  β i v upon completion of the 
project, and the flow payments add up to zero, i.e.,  ∑ i=1 n h i (q) = 0 for all  q .
An implication of this result is that it is impossible to construct a mechanism 
that is simultaneously efficient and strictly budget balanced. Moreover, if we 
require flow-payment functions  h i (·) to be nonnegative (or if we restrict attention 
to symmetric agents and symmetric mechanisms), then there exists no strictly 
 budget-balanced mechanism that yields a greater total discounted payoff as an 
outcome of an MPE than the payoff corresponding to the case characterized in 
Proposition 1.
While this is a negative result, as shown in the following proposition, it is possi-
ble to construct a mechanism that is efficient and budget balanced on the equilibrium 
path (but not strictly budget balanced) and which will never have a budget deficit.
PROPOSITION 5: suppose that each agent commits to making flow payments 
as given by (9) for all  q , where  ∑ i=1 n p i =  (n − 1)  s –(0) , and he receives lump-
sum reward  min {v −  p i ,   β i (v +  H τ ) } upon completion of the project, where 
β i =  v −  p i   _____________ v+ (n − 1)  [v −  s –(0) ] . Then:
 (i) There exists a Markov-perfect equilibrium in which at every moment each 
agent exerts the efficient level of effort  a –i (q) as characterized in Proposition 2.
 (ii) The mechanism is budget balanced on the equilibrium path, and it will never 
result in a budget deficit (including off equilibrium).
 (iii) The agents’ total ex ante discounted payoff is equal to the first-best discounted 
payoff, i.e.,  ∑ i=1 n J ˆi (0) =  s –(0) .
322 AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics novEMBEr 2016
The intuition for why there exists no efficient, strictly budget-balanced mech-
anism (as shown in Lemma 2) is as follows: to attain efficiency, the mechanism 
must eliminate the agents’ incentives to shirk. However, with strict budget balance, 
by shirking, an agent can delay the completion of the project, let the balance in the 
savings account grow, and collect a larger reward upon completion. By capping each 
agent’s reward to  v −  p i , his incentive to procrastinate is eliminated, and efficiency 
becomes attainable. 
Note that because the mechanism may burn money off the equilibrium path, it 
is important that the agents commit to not renegotiating the mechanism should that 
contingency arise.9
B. Limited (but sufficient) cash reserves
Because the mechanism requires that the agents make flow payments while the 
project is in progress, two complications arise when they have limited cash reserves. 
First, the mechanism must incorporate the possibility that one or more agents run 
out of cash before the project is completed. Second, for the efficient mechanism to 
be resource feasible, the agents must have sufficient cash in hand. This section is 
concerned with addressing these issues. 
The following proposition establishes a necessary and sufficient condition for the 
mechanism characterized in Proposition 5 to be resource feasible; that is, each agent 
has enough cash  w i to make the flow payments  h i (·) on the equilibrium path.
PROPOSITION 6: The mechanism characterized in Proposition 5 is resource feasi-
ble if and only if there exist  { p i } i=1 n such that  ∑ i=1 n p i =  (n − 1)  s –(0) ,
  p i (1 −  e −r τ – ) ≤  w i −  ∫ 0  τ – e −rt  ∑ j≠i c j ( f j ( s –′ ( q t ) ) ) dt and  p i ≤  s –(0)   
for all  i , where  s 
–(·) is characterized in Proposition 2, and  τ – is the corresponding 
first-best completion time.
if the agents are symmetric (i.e.,  c i (·) ≡  c j (·) and  w i =  w j for all  i and  j ), then 
the mechanism is resource feasible if and only if  w i ≥  e −r τ – ( n − 1 _n ) [v −  s –(0) ] for all 
i , where this threshold increases in the group size  n .10
The first condition asserts that each agent must have sufficient cash to make the 
flow payments  h i (·) on the equilibrium path. The second condition is each agent’s 
individual rationality constraint, i.e., each agent’s ex ante discounted payoff must be 
9 This contingency will arise if the agents exert less than first-best effort, which will result in the project being 
completed at some time  τ >  τ – and the balance in the savings account  H τ exceeding  (n − 1) v . In this case, the 
mechanism specifies that each agent  i receives reward  v −  p i upon completion and the surplus  H τ −  (n − 1) v is 
burned. 
10 This follows from Remark 1, which shows that the first-best completion time  τ – decreases in  n . Therefore, 
e −r τ – ( n − 1 _n )  [v −  s –( q 0 ) ] increases in  n . 
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nonnegative. In general, these conditions are satisfied if each agent’s cash reserves 
are sufficiently large.11, 12 
Intuitively, the minimum cash reserves needed to implement the mechanism 
increase in the group size, because the inefficiencies due to shirking and front-load-
ing become more severe the larger the group. As a result, the mechanism must spec-
ify larger payments to neutralize those inefficiencies. 
Even if the conditions in Proposition 6 are satisfied, it is still possible, off equi-
librium, for one or more agents to run out of cash before the project is completed, in 
which case they will be unable to make the flow payments specified by the mecha-
nism. Thus, the mechanism must specify the flow payments as a function not only 
of the state  q , but also of the agents’ cash reserves. 
To analyze this case, we denote by  i i (q) the indicator random variable that is 
equal to one if agent  i has not run out of cash at any state  q ̃ < q and zero other-
wise. The following proposition shows that the efficiency properties established in 
Proposition 5 continue to hold if each agent “loses” his share when he runs out of 
cash before the project is completed.
PROPOSITION 7: suppose each agent commits to making flow payments 
h i (q)  i i (q) for all  q  (where  ∑ i=1 n p i =  (n − 1)  s –(0) ) , and upon completion of 
the project, he receives lump-sum reward  min {v −  p i ,   β i (v +  H τ ) }  i i (Q) , where 
β i =  v −  p i   _____________ v+ (n − 1)  [v −  s –(0) ] . Moreover, assume the conditions of Proposition 6 are 
satisfied. Then the properties of Proposition 5 continue to hold.
For the mechanism to induce efficient incentives, it must punish any agent who 
runs out of cash, for this should not occur in equilibrium. In addition, if an agent 
runs out of cash, then the share that he “loses” must be burned, i.e., it cannot be 
shared among other agents. This is to deter agents from shirking as a means of run-
ning an agent out of cash in order to collect his “lost” share.
IV. Uncertainty and Time Dependence
To simplify the exposition and distill the economic intuition, we have assumed 
that the project progresses deterministically and restricted attention to the set of 
mechanisms that depend on the state of the project  q , but not on time  t . In this 
section, we relax these restrictions by using a model similar to that in Georgiadis 
11 Note that in the symmetric case, we have  p i =  ( n − 1 _n )  s –(0) and  ∫ 0  τ – e −rt  ∑ j≠i   c j ( f j ( s – ′ ( q t ) ) ) 
=  n − 1 _n [ e −r τ – v −  s –(0) ] for all  i . Thus, the first condition reduces to  w i >  e −r τ – ( n − 1 _n )  [v −  s –(0) ] and the second 
condition is automatically satisfied. 
12 We have also characterized the time-independent mechanism that maximizes the agents’ discounted payoff 
when the conditions established in Section IIIB are not satisfied, and hence the efficient mechanism cannot be 
implemented. This analysis is available upon request. However, we show below that the efficient mechanism can 
be implemented when allowing time dependence in such a way that the flow payments are equal to zero on the 
equilibrium path. 
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(2015a), and we characterize the efficient, time-dependent mechanism in an uncer-
tain environment. In this model, the state of the project progresses according to
  d q t =  ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i, t ) dt + σd W t , 
where  W t is a standard Brownian motion and  σ > 0 captures the degree of uncer-
tainty associated with the evolution of the project. Moreover, we assume throughout 
that  w i = ∞ for all  i (i.e., that agents have unlimited cash reserves). The model is 
otherwise identical to the one presented in Section I. The planner’s problem satisfies 
the ODE
(11)  r s –(q) = − ∑ 
i=1
n
 c i ( f i ( s –′ (q) ) ) +  [ ∑ i=1
n
  f i ( s –′ (q) ) ]  s –′ (q) +   σ 2  _2 s –′′ (q)  
subject to the boundary conditions
(12)  lim 
q→−∞ 
  s –(q) = 0 and  s –(Q) = v. 
Georgiadis (2015a) provides conditions under which (11) subject to (12) admits 
a unique, smooth solution.13 Each agent’s first-best level of effort satisfies  a –i (q) =  f i ( s –′ (q) ) , and (similarly to the deterministic case)  a – i ′(q) > 0 for all  i and  q . 
Next consider each agent’s problem facing an arbitrary flow-payments function 
h i (t, q) and a reward function  g i (t) . Using standard arguments, we expect agent  i ’s 
discounted payoff function to satisfy the HJB equation
(13)  r J i (t, q) −  J t, i (t, q) =  max  a i    {− c i ( a i ) +  ( ∑ j=1
n
 a j )  J q, i (t, q) +   σ 2  _2 J qq, i (t, q) −  h i (t, q) } 
subject to  lim q→−∞  J ˆi (q) = 0 and  J i (t, Q) =  g i (t) .14 His first-order condition is 
c i ′( a i ) =  J q, i (t, q) , and because we want to induce each agent to exert the efficient 
effort level, we must have  c i ′( a i ) =  s –′ (q) . Therefore, it needs to be the case that each 
agent’s discounted payoff satisfy
  J i (t, q) =  s –(q) −  p i (t) , 
where  p i (·) is a function of time that remains to be determined. From the boundary 
conditions for  J i (·, ·) and  s –(·) , it follows that  p i (t) = v −  g i (t) , and using this, 
together with (13) and (11), we can see that the flow-payment function that induces 
first-best effort is
  h i (t, q) =  ∑ 
j≠i
c j (  f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) + r [v −  g i (t) ] +  g i ′(t) . 
13 Roughly, a sufficient condition is that each agent’s effort cost function  c i (·) is sufficiently convex (i.e.,  c i ′(a) 
is sufficiently large for large values of  a ). This condition is satisfied if, for example,  c i (a) =  λ i a p , where  p ≥ 2 . 
14   J t, i (t, q) and  J q, i (t, q) denote the derivative of  J i (t, q) with respect to  t and  q , respectively. 
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We choose the set of functions  { g i (t) } 
i=1 
n
 such that along the equilibrium (or 
equivalently, the first-best) path  q –t , each agent  i ’s expected flow payment  E [h (t,  q –t ) ] 
is equal to zero, i.e.,
(14)  0 =  ∑ 
j≠i
E [ c j ( f j ( s –′( q –t )) ) ] + r (v −  g i (t) ) +  g i ′(t) , 
where the expectation is taken with respect to the state of the project along the 
equilibrium path. This is an ODE that can be solved for any given initial condition 
g i (0) ≤ v . To ensure that the sum of the agents’ discounted payoffs is equal to the 
first-best payoff, the set of initial conditions  { g i (0) } 
i=1 
n
 must satisfy  ∑ i=1 n J i (0, 0) =  s –(0) , or equivalently,
(15)  ∑ 
i=1
n
 g i (0) = v +  (n − 1)  [v −  s –(0) ] . 
By substituting (14) into  h i (t, q) , we get the following expression for each agent’s 
flow-payment function that induces first-best efforts:
(16)  h i (t, q) =  ∑ 
j≠i[ c j ( f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) − E [ c j ( f j ( s –′ ( q –t ) ) ) ] ] . 
Finally, it follows from (16) that (15) ensures that the mechanism is ex ante 
budget balanced (in expectation).15 Therefore, we have established the following 
proposition:
PROPOSITION 8: suppose that each agent makes flow payments  h i (t, q) and 
receives  g i (τ) upon completion of the project, where  h i (t, q) and  g i (τ) satisfy (16) 
and (14), respectively. Then,  g i (τ) decreases in  τ , and there exists an MPE in which 
at every moment each agent exerts the first-best effort level. in this equilibrium, the 
sum of the agents’ expected discounted payoffs is equal to the first-best expected 
discounted payoff, and each agent’s local flow payment has expected value equal to 
0 . Moreover, this mechanism is ex ante budget balanced (i.e., in expectation).
The key difference relative to the time-independent case is that the mecha-
nism now has two levers at its disposal to neutralize the inefficiencies described in 
Section IIC. To neutralize the agents’ incentives to front-load effort, the mechanism 
specifies that flow payments are positive if and only if the current state  q is strictly 
greater than  E [ q –t ] , i.e., the expected state if all agents were exerting the efficient 
level of effort. To eliminate the agents’ incentives to shirk due to receiving only 
15 Noting that the ex ante budget-balance condition is  ∑ i=1 n E [ ∫ 0 τ e −rt h i, t dt −  e −r τ g i (τ) +  e −r τ v _n] = 0 , and by 
using (1) and (16), one can show that it is equivalent to (15). 
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a share of the project’s payoff, the mechanism specifies that each agent’s reward 
decreases in the completion time  τ at a sufficiently rapid rate.16
There are two important differences relative to the deterministic mechanism. 
First, in the stochastic mechanism, it is impossible to simultaneously achieve effi-
ciency and ex post budget balance. Instead, the mechanism is budget balanced only 
in expectation, and as a result, for the mechanism to be resource feasible, there needs 
to be a third party who collects the surplus if the balance in the savings account upon 
completion of the project exceeds  ∑ i=1 n g i (τ) − v and who pays the difference oth-
erwise. Second, flow payments may be positive or negative, and because the path of 
the Brownian motion until the project is completed can be arbitrarily long, for the 
mechanism to be resource feasible, it is necessary that the agents as well as the third 
party be cash unconstrained.17 
The following remark characterizes the set of time-independent mechanisms that 
implement the efficient outcome in the game with uncertainty.
Remark 3: Let  g i (t) =  G i , where  G i ≥ 0 and  ∑ i=1 n G i = v +  (n − 1)  [v −  s –(0) ] . 
Suppose that each agent makes (time-independent) flow payments that satisfy (16) 
and receives  G i upon completion of the project. Then, there exists an MPE in which 
at every moment each agent exerts the first-best effort level. Moreover, this mecha-
nism is ex ante budget balanced (i.e., in expectation).
special case:  σ = 0 .—We now characterize the efficient time-dependent mech-
anism when the project progresses deterministically, i.e., when  σ = 0 . The analysis 
is the same as in the stochastic case, except that the efficient path  q –t is now deter-
ministic. As a result, the efficient mechanism specifies zero flow payments on the 
equilibrium path (and positive flow payments only off equilibrium).
COROLLARY 1: suppose that each agent makes flow payments  h ˆ i (t, q) =  [ h i (t, q) ] + 
and receives  g ˆ i (τ) =  [min { α i v,   g i (τ) } ] + upon completion of the project, which 
decreases in  τ , where  h i (t, q) and  g i (τ) satisfy (16) and (14), respectively. Then there 
exists an MPE in which at every moment each agent exerts the first-best effort level, 
makes  0 flow payments along the evolution path of the project, and receives reward 
α i v upon completion. in this equilibrium, the sum of the agents’ discounted payoffs 
is equal to the first-best discounted payoff. Moreover, this mechanism is budget bal-
anced on the equilibrium path and never has a budget deficit.
By specifying a reward  g i (τ) that decreases in the completion time  τ , the mecha-
nism induces each agent to complete the project by no later than the efficient comple-
tion time  τ –. To neutralize the agents’ incentives to front-load effort, the mechanism 
specifies that as long as the state  q at time  t coincides with  q –(t) , the flow payments 
16 This is reminiscent of the optimal contract in Mason and Välimäki (2015) who study “Poisson projects.” 
17 However, this is less of an issue if one interprets the flow payments as difference between the entrepreneur’s 
wage in the startup and the market rate if he were to seek employment elsewhere, as discussed in the introduction. 
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are  0 , but they are strictly positive whenever  q >  q –(t) , which will occur if one or 
more agents work harder than first best.
V. Other Applications
We have developed our efficient mechanism in the context of games of dynamic 
contributions to a public good. More broadly however, our mechanism can be read-
ily applied to any dynamic game with externalities. In this section, we illustrate this 
versatility by extending our approach to two classes of games that have been exten-
sively studied in the economics literature—a dynamic common resource extraction 
problem and a strategic experimentation problem—and we construct a mechanism, 
which at every moment induces the agents to choose the efficient actions in an MPE. 
To simplify the exposition, we shall assume throughout this section that each agent 
has large cash reserves at the outset of the game, and we will restrict attention to the 
set of time-independent mechanisms.
A. Dynamic Extraction of an Exhaustible common resource
First, we adapt our mechanism to a game in which a group of agents extracts an 
exhaustible common resource over time, similar to the one studied by Levhari and 
Mirman (1980) and Reinganum and Stokey (1985).
Model.—A group of  n agents jointly extracts a common resource. Time 
 t ∈  [0,  ∞) is continuous. The initial stock of the resource at time  0 is equal to  Q , 
and it decreases according to
  d q t = − ∑ 
i=1
n
 a i, t dt, 
where  a i, t ≥ 0 denotes the instantaneous extraction rate of agent  i at time  t . At every 
moment  t , each agent  i observes the remaining stock  q t , and chooses his extraction 
rate  a i, t , which yields him flow utility  u i ( a i, t ) , where  u i (·) is a strictly increasing, 
strictly concave function satisfying  u i (0) = 0 ,  u i ′(0) > 0 , and  lim c→∞  u i ′(c) = 0 . 
The game ends at the first stopping time  τ such that  q τ = 0 , i.e., as soon as the 
resource is depleted.
Efficient Mechanism.—We begin by considering the problem faced by a social 
planner who chooses the agents’ extraction rates to maximize the discounted total 
surplus. His discounted payoff function satisfies the HJB equation
(17)  r s –(q) =  max  a 1 , .. ,  a n    { ∑ i=1
n
 u i ( a i ) −  ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i, t )  s –′ (q) }  
subject to the boundary condition  s 
–(0) = 0 . This condition states that the game 
ends and the agents receive no further payoffs as soon as the resource is depleted. 
The corresponding first-order conditions are  u i ′( a i ) =  s –′ (q) for all  i , i.e., each 
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agent’s marginal utility from extraction must at all times be equal to the marginal 
cost associated with a smaller amount of the resource remaining in the future. Under 
regularity conditions on  u i (·) , a solution to this problem exists, and we shall denote 
each agent’s efficient extraction rate by  a –i (q) .18 It is straightforward to show that 
along the efficient extraction path, each agent extracts the resource at a slower rate 
as it becomes more scarce; in other words,  a –i (q) increases in  q . 
We consider the set of mechanisms that specify flow subsidies as a function of 
the remaining amount of the resource  q , which we denote by  { s i (q) } 
i=1 
n
 . Given an 
arbitrary mechanism, each agent  i ’s discounted payoff satisfies the HJB equation
(18)  r J i (q) =  max  a i    { u i ( a i ) −  ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i, t )  J i ′(q) +  s i (q) }  
subject to a boundary condition that remains to be determined. Each agent’s  first-order 
condition is now  u i ′( a i ) =  J i ′(q) , so to implement the first-best actions, the mech-
anism must be such that  J ˆ i ′(q) =  s –′ (q) , which implies that  J i (q) =  s –(q) −  p i for 
all  i and  q , where  p i is a constant to be determined. Notice that  J i (0) = − p i , i.e., 
as soon as the resource is depleted, each agent  i must pay a penalty  p i to the social 
planner and the game ends. By using (17) and solving for  s i (q) in (18), one obtains
  s i (q) =  ∑ 
j≠i
u j ( a –j (q) ) − r p i . 
Observe that the mechanism pays each agent a flow subsidy that decreases as the 
resource becomes more scarce (i.e.,  s i ′(q) ≥ 0 for all  i and  q ). Moreover, if  p i > 0 , 
then the flow subsidy can become negative for sufficiently small values of the stock. 
Intuitively, because in equilibrium the agents do not internalize the negative exter-
nality of their actions on the other agents, they have incentives to overharvest the 
resource. To counteract their incentives to free ride and to restore efficiency, the 
mechanism specifies subsidies that decrease in the remaining stock at a rate such 
that the cost associated with receiving a smaller subsidy (or having to make a larger 
payment) in the future exactly offsets each agent’s present benefit from overharvest-
ing the resource.
Next, suppose that the social planner requires that the budget be balanced (in 
equilibrium). Allowing upfront payments, which we denote by  { P i, 0 } 
i=1 n , the sum 
of the agents’ ex ante discounted payoffs must be equal to the planner’s discounted 
payoff, so
   ∑ 
i=1
n
 [ J i (Q) −  p i −  P i, 0 ] = ns (Q) −  ∑ 
i=1
n
  ( p i +  P i, 0 ) 
 = s (Q) ⇒  ∑ 
i=1
n
  ( p i +  P i, 0 ) =  (n − 1) s (Q) . 
18 For example, if  u i (a) = λ a ρ , where  λ > 0 and  ρ ∈  (0, 1) , then it is possible to characterize the solution to 
the planner’s problem analytically. 
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In summary, the efficient mechanism specifies that each agent must pay an 
“entry” fee  P i, 0 in exchange for access to the resource, receives a subsidy  s i (q) that 
is a function of the amount of resource that remains, and must pay a penalty  p i 
at the moment the resource is depleted. Notice that the budget-balance condition 
only pins down the sum of the entry fees and the penalties due upon depletion. The 
individual amounts will depend on the parties’ cash constraints and the way they 
decide to split the profits. For example, if the agents are cash constrained, then 
the planner might set  P i, 0 = 0 for all  i and choose the penalties such that  ∑ i=1 n p i 
=  (n − 1) s (Q) , which the agents will be able to fund using the subsidies that they 
receive. In this case, the budget is balanced, and provided that the agents cannot 
default on the penalty payments, the mechanism can be implemented even if the 
agents are cash constrained. On the other hand, if the social planner is cash con-
strained, then she might set  p i = 0 for all  i and choose the entry fees such that 
 ∑ i=1 n P i, 0 =  (n − 1) s (Q) .
B. strategic Experimentation
We now consider a strategic experimentation game similar to the ones studied by 
Keller, Rady, and Cripps (2005) and Bonatti and Hörner (2011), and we construct a 
mechanism that restores efficiency in an MPE.
Model.—A group of  n agents faces a two-armed bandit problem, and each agent 
continuously chooses how much (costly) effort to allocate to each arm. The first 
arm is “safe:” it yields an expected flow payoff that is equal to  0 (net of the cost of 
effort) and known to all players. The other arm is “risky,” and it can be either “bad” 
or “good” for all players. If it is bad, then it never yields any payoff. If it is good, 
then it yields a lump-sum payoff equal to  1 at random times that arrive according 
to a Poisson process with rate equal to each agent’s instantaneous effort level. The 
arrival of these lump sums is independent across the agents (conditional on the arm 
being good). The agents hold a common prior belief  q 0 about the probability that 
the risky arm is good, and they observe each other’s actions and outcomes, so that 
they hold a common posterior belief at all times. We let  q t denote the agents’ belief 
at time  t that the risky arm is good. It follows from Bayes’ rule that as long as no 
Poisson arrival has occurred, this belief evolves according to
  d q t = − q t (1 −  q t )  ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i, t ) dt, 
where  a i, t denotes agent  i ’s experimentation level on the risky arm at time  t . 
Following a Poisson arrival, the agents learn that the risky arm is good; the (public) 
belief jumps to  1 and remains there forever. At every moment each agent  i observes 
the common belief  q t that the risky arm is good and chooses his experimentation 
level  a i, t at cost  c i ( a i, t ) , where  c i (·) is a strictly increasing, strictly convex, differen-
tiable function satisfying  c i (0) =  c i ′(0) = 0 .
330 AMEricAn EconoMic JournAL: MicroEconoMics novEMBEr 2016
Efficient Mechanism.—First, consider the problem faced by a social planner who 
chooses the agents’ effort levels to maximize social surplus. Her discounted payoff 
function satisfies the HJB equation
(19)  rs (q) =  max  a 1 , .. ,  a n    { ∑ i=1
n
 [q  a i −  c i ( a i ) ] + q ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i ) [s (1) − s (q) ] 
 − q (1 − q)  ( ∑ i=1
n
 a i )  s ′ (q) } ,  
where  s (1) =  1 _r∑ i=1 n [ f i (1) −  c i ( f i (1) ) ] and  f i (·) =  c i ′−1 (max {0, ·} ) .19 The first 
term on the right side captures the agents’ flow payoffs (less their effort cost), the 
second term captures the expected utility from a Poisson arrival (which will lead the 
belief to jump from  q to  1 ), and the third term captures the flow cost associated with 
the agents becoming more pessimistic about the risky arm being good.
We assume that the planner’s problem admits a smooth solution and denote each 
agent’s efficient experimentation level by  a –i (q) . If the agents have identical exper-
imentation costs, then one can show that in any solution to the planner’s problem 
there exists a threshold  q ∈  [0, 1) such that  a –i (q) > 0 and  a – i ′(q) > 0 for all  i (and so 
s (q) > 0 ) if and only if  q >  q _ . In other words, the agents experiment more intensely 
the more optimistic they are about the risky arm being good, and below a threshold 
belief, they stop experimenting altogether. We expect a similar property to hold for 
the general case with asymmetric agents. 
We consider the set of mechanisms that specify flow subsidies  { s i (q) } 
i=1 
n
 as a 
function of the belief  q and a prize  v i to agent  i if he is the first to obtain a Poisson 
arrival. Given an arbitrary mechanism, agent  i ’s discounted payoff function satisfies 
the HJB equation
(20)   r J i (q) =  max  a i    {q (1 + v i 1  {q<1}  )  a i −  c i ( a i ) 
  + q ( ∑ k=1
n
 a k ) [ J i (1) −  J i (q) ] − q (1 − q) ( ∑ k=1
n
 a k )  J i ′(q) +  s i (q) } , 
where  J i (1) =  1 _r[ f i (1) −  c i (  f i (1) ) ] . First, notice from (19) and (20) that following 
a Poisson arrival (in which case  q = 1 ), the agents exert the efficient experimen-
tation level forever after. Therefore, the subsidies should be equal to  0 whenever 
q = 1 . Turning to the case in which  q < 1 , for the agents to have efficient incen-
tives to experiment, the first-order condition in (20) must match the one in the plan-
ner’s problem:
  s (1) − s (q) −  (1 − q) s′ (q) =  v i +  J i (1) −  J i (q) −  (1 − q)  J i ′(q) 
19 If  q = 1 , notice that (19) reduces to  rs (1) =  max  a 1 , .. ,  a n   { ∑ i=1 n [ a i −  c i ( a i ) ] } , so the optimal effort levels 
satisfy  c i ′( a i ) = 1 , or equivalently,  a –i (1) =  f i (1) for all  i . 
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for all  i and  q < 1 . This condition is satisfied if  J i (q) = s (q) −  [s (1) −  J i (1) −  v i ] 
for all  i and  q . Solving for  s i (q) using (19) and (20) yields
(21)  s i (q) =  ∑ 
k≠i[q (1 +  v i )  a –k (q) −  c k ( a –k (q) ) ] − r [s (1) −  J i (1) −  v i ]  
for all  q < 1 , and the first agent who accomplishes a breakthrough receives a lump-
sum reward  v i . Following a breakthrough, it becomes common knowledge that the 
risky arm is good, each agent exerts the efficient effort level from that time onwards, 
and no further subsidies are disbursed. 
An important assumption is that experimentation levels are observable, which 
results in the agents holding a common posterior belief at all times. If experimenta-
tion levels are not observable as in Bonatti and Hörner (2011), then an agent’s pres-
ent action does not influence the future actions of others. As a result, flow subsidies 
are unnecessary in this case, and efficiency can be attained either by specifying an 
appropriate lump-sum reward for the agent who is first to achieve a breakthrough or 
by using a time-dependent mechanism. 
Notice that the efficient mechanism does not pin down the prizes  { v i } i=1 n . As 
can be seen from (21), the subsidy  s i (·) (and hence the implementation cost of the 
mechanism) increases in the prize  v i . However, if  v i is too small, then the subsidy 
can become negative (thus amounting to flow payments) for sufficiently pessimistic 
beliefs. Therefore, the choice of  { v i } i=1 n must trade off the need to keep the imple-
mentation cost of the mechanism low, and to satisfy the agents’ cash constraints. 
Figure 1 uses an example with identical agents and quadratic costs to illustrate how 
the agents’ experimentation levels and the efficiency-inducing subsidies depend on 
the belief  q for different levels of the prize  v .
Figure 1
notes: An example of the strategic experimentation problem with  r = 0.1 ,  n = 5 , and 
 c  i (a) =   a 2  __2 for all i. Panel A illustrates each agent’s efficient experimentation level as a func-
tion of the public belief  q . Panel B illustrates the subsidy as a function of the belief  q for dif-
ferent choices of  v .
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Finally, suppose that budget balance is desired. Then depending on the 
choice of  { v i } i=1 n , each agent may have to pay an “entry fee” to participate in the 
 efficiency-inducing mechanism, which will be used to fund the subsidies that he will 
receive in the future. Ex ante budget balance requires that
  ∑ 
i=1
n
 [ J i ( q 0 ) −  P i, 0 ] = s ( q 0 ) ⇒  ∑ 
i=1
n
 ( P i, 0 +  v i ) =  (n − 1)  [s (1) − s ( q 0 ) ] , 
and similarly to the previous applications, the individual entry fees and 
prizes  { P i, 0 ,   v i } 
i=1 n will be determined by the way the agents decide to split the prof-
its and the parties’ cash constraints.
VI. Discussion
We study a simple model of dynamic contributions to a public good project. In 
our model, each of  n agents continuously chooses how much effort to allocate to 
a joint project, and the project generates a lump-sum payoff once the cumulative 
efforts reach a prespecified threshold. A standard result in such models is that effort 
is under-provided relative to the efficient outcome due to the free-rider problem. In 
addition, in our dynamic setting, there is a second form of inefficiency: the agents 
front-load their effort to induce others to raise their future efforts. We propose a 
mechanism that induces each agent to always exert the efficient level of effort as the 
outcome of a Markov perfect equilibrium. The mechanism specifies for each agent 
flow payments that are due while the project is in progress and a lump-sum reward 
that is disbursed upon completion of the project. 
While we develop our mechanism in the context of a dynamic contributions game, 
it can be readily applied to other dynamic games with externalities. We illustrate this 
versatility by adapting it to a dynamic common resource extraction problem, as well 
as a strategic experimentation problem. 
A limitation of our model is that the agents must have sufficient cash in hand at 
the outset of the game in order to implement the efficient mechanism. In particu-
lar, if the project progresses stochastically, then each agent must have unlimited 
liability. We leave for future work the characterization of the optimal mechanism 
when each agent has limited cash reserves and the project evolves stochastically. 
This problem is challenging, because it requires additional state variables: namely, 
each agent’s remaining cash reserves and continuation payoff. This would require 
extending the approach of Sannikov (2008) to the case of more than one state vari-
able and the case of optimization over both the flow-payments rate and the final pay-
ment. Alternatively, the more general Stochastic Maximum Principle (Hamiltonian) 
approach of Cvitanic´ and Zhang (2012) might be applied, as in Iijima and Kasahara 
(2015).
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Appendix: Proofs
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1: 
We first study the existence of a solution. We write the ODE system (4) in the 
form
  J i (q) =  G i ( J 1 ′ (q) ,  … ,  J n ′ (q) ) ,
where  G i ( J 1 ′ (q) ,  … ,  J n ′ (q) ) =  1 _r{− c i (  f i ( J i ′) ) +  [ ∑ j=1 n f j ( J j ′) ]  J i ′} . Since the FOC is 
c i ′( a i (q)) =  J i ′(q) and  c i ′ > 0 , we are looking for a solution such that  min j  J j ′ > 0 . 
Thus, we consider  G i only on the domain  + n  =  (0, ∞) n . It follows then from (4) and the monotonicity of  x f i (x) −  c i ( f i (x)) that  min j  J j > 0 . 
We need the following lemma.
LEMMA 3: The mapping  G =  ( G 1 ,  … ,  G n ) from  + n  to  + n  is invertible and 
the inverse mapping  F is continuously differentiable. Moreover,  
∂ F i  _∂ x i > 0 , that is, the 
 i -th component of the inverse mapping is strictly increasing in the  i-th variable.
PROOF OF LEMMA 3: 
By the Gale-Nikaido generalization of Inverse Function Theorem (see, for exam-
ple, theorem 20.4 in Nikaido 1968), for the first part of the lemma it is sufficient 
to show that all the principal minors of the Jacobian matrix of the mapping  G are 
strictly positive for all  ( J 1 ′ ,  .. ,  J n ′ ) ∈  + n  . We sketch the proof. The  1 × 1 principal 
minors, that is, the diagonal entries  1 _r  ∑ j=1 n f j ( J j ′) of the Jacobian are positive (for 
any  n ). For  n = 2 , from the expressions for the partial derivatives of  G i , we see that 
the determinant of the Jacobian is proportional to
  (  ∑ j=1
2
  f j ( J j ′) ) 
2
 −  f 1 ′ ( J 1 ′ )  f 2 ′ ( J 2 ′ )  J 1 ′ J 2 ′ > 0 ,
where the inequality holds on the domain  + 2  , by noting that  f i (x) > x f i ′(x) for all 
i and  x > 0 .20 Straightforward, but tedious computations show that the determinants 
for  n = 3 and  n = 4 are proportional to
  ∑ 
j=1
3
  f j ( J j ′)  [ (  ∑ j=1
3
  f j ( J j ′) ) 
2
 −  ∑ 
i<j
 f i ′( J i ′ )  f j ′( J j ′) J i ′ J j ′] + 2 Π k=1 3 f k ′ ( J k ′ ) J k ′ 
20 To see why, first note that for all  x > 0 we have  f i ′( c i ′(x) ) =  1 ___  c i ′′ (x) and so  f i ′′ ( c i ′(x) ) = −  c i ′′′ (x)  _____  [ c i ′′ (x) ] 2 ≤ 0 . Next, 
let  k i (x) =  f i (x) − x f i ′(x) , and observe that  k i (0) = 0 by assumption and  k i ′(x) = − x f i ′′ (x) ≥ 0 for all  x > 0 . 
Therefore,  f i (x) > x f i ′(x) for all  x > 0 . 
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and, respectively,
  ( ∑ j  f j ( J j ′) ) 
2
 [ ( ∑ j  f j ( J j ′) ) 
2
 −  ∑ 
i<j
f i ′ f j ′ J i ′ J j ′]  + 2 ∑ i<j<k f i  ′ f j ′  f k ′ J i ′ J j ′ J k ′  ∑ j f j ( J j ′) 
 − 3 f 1 ′  f 2 ′  f 3 ′  f 4  ′ J 1 ′ J 2 ′ J 3 ′ J 4 ′ 
Both of these expressions are positive, by a similar argument as for  n = 2 . In 
general, it can be verified that the determinant of the  n− dimensional Jacobian has 
the term
  ( ∑ j  f j ( J j ′) ) 
n−2
 [ ( ∑ j  f j ( J j ′) ) 
2
 −  ∑ 
i<j
 f i ′ f j ′  J i ′  J j ′] ,
which is positive, and that the remaining terms are of the form , for  k = 3, 4, … , n ,
  c k ∑  i 1 < … < i k  f  i 1  ′ J  i 1  ′ ⋯  f  i k  ′ J  i k  ′ ( ∑ j  f j ( J j ′) ) 
n−k
 ,
where  c k > 0 for  k odd, and  c k < 0 for  k even, and the values of  c k are such that 
the positive terms dominate the negative terms  (when we take into account that 
 f i (x) > x f i ′(x) ) .
Similar computations show that not only the determinants, but all the principal 
minors are positive.
For the last statement of the lemma, by the Inverse Function Theorem, we need 
to show that the diagonal entries of the inverse of the Jacobian matrix are strictly 
positive. By Cramer’s rule, those entries are proportional to the diagonal entries of 
the adjugate of the Jacobian, thus proportional to the diagonal entries of the cofac-
tor matrix of the Jacobian. Those entries are equal to the corresponding  (n − 1) 
×  (n − 1) principal minors, which, by the argument above, are positive. ∎
This lemma asserts that, if the values  J i and the marginal values  J i ′ solve the HJB 
equation, then they are in one-to-one smooth strictly increasing correspondence, and 
so are the optimal actions  a i . That is, increasing an agent’s action also increases his 
value function, and vice versa (holding everything else constant).
Next, we show that the set of solutions to the system of ODE’s is not empty.
LEMMA 4: For every  ϵ ∈  (0,  min i  { v i } ) , there exists some  Q ϵ > 0 such that there 
exists a unique solution  ( J 1 ,  … ,  J n ) to the oDE system on interval  [0,  Q ϵ ] that sat-
isfies  J i ≥ ϵ on that interval, for all  i .
PROOF OF LEMMA 4: 
The ODE system (4) can be written as
(22)  J i ′(q) = F i ( J 1 (q) ,  … ,  J n (q) ) .
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For given  ϵ > 0 , denote
  M F = max i 
 
max ϵ≤ x i ≤ v i  
  F i ( x 1 ,  … ,  x n ) .
Pick  Q ϵ sufficiently close to zero so that, for all  i ,
  v i −  ( Q ϵ )  M F ≥ ϵ 
Then, define  Δq =   Q ϵ  _n and functions  J i n by Picard iterations, going backwards from 
Q ϵ ,
 J i n ( Q ϵ ) =  v i 
  J i n ( Q ϵ − Δq) =  v i − Δq F i ( v 1 ,  … ,  v n ) 
  J i n ( Q ϵ − 2Δq) =  J i n ( Q ϵ − Δq) − Δq F i ( J 1 n ( Q ϵ − Δq) ,  … ,  J n n ( Q ϵ − Δq) ) 
 =  v i − Δq F i ( v 1 ,  … ,  v n ) − Δq F i ( J 1 n ( Q ϵ − Δq) ,  … ,  J n n ( Q ϵ − Δq) ) 
and so on, until  J i n ( Q ϵ − nΔq) = J i (0) . Then, we complete the definition 
of function  J i n by making it piecewise linear between the points  Q ϵ − kΔq , 
k = 1,  … , n . Notice, from the assumption on  Q ϵ that  J i n (v − kΔq) ≥ ϵ , for all 
k = 1,  … , n . Since  F i are continuously differentiable, they are Lipschitz on the 
n− dimensional bounded domain  Π j=1 n [ϵ,  v i ] . Thus, by the standard ODE argument, 
 { J i n } converge to a unique solution  { J i } of the ODE system on  q ∈  [0,  Q ϵ ] , and we 
have  J i ≥ ϵ . ∎
Lemma 4 shows that the system of ODE’s has a unique solution on  [0,  sup ϵ  Q ϵ ) .
Next, fixing  Q <  sup ϵ  Q ϵ , we now want to show that the ODE solution  J i (q) is the 
value function of agent  i , for every initial project value  q 0 ∈ [0, Q] , if every other 
agent plays  a j (q) =  J j ′(q) . We have, for any action  a i ( q t ) ,
  e −rτ J i (Q) = J i ( q 0 ) +  ∫ 0 τ d ( e −rt J i ( q t ) ) 
 =  J i ( q 0 ) +  ∫ 0 τ  e −rt [−r J i ( q t ) +  J i ′( q t )  ∑ j=1
n
 a j ( q t ) ] dt
 ≤  J i ( q 0 ) +  ∫ 0 τ  e −rt c i ( a i ( q t ) ) dt ,
where the last inequality is due to the HJB equation (2). Since  J i (Q) =  α i v , 
this implies that the agent’s value function, denoted  J i ∗ , satisfies  J i ∗ ( q 0 ) ≤  J i ( q 0 ) . 
Moreover, the upper bound is attained if the agent plays  a i (q) =  J i ′(q) .
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Note that since the inverse  F of  G is differentiable, so are the functions  J i ′. To 
establish convexity, we differentiate the ODE for  J i to obtain
  r J i ′ = − J i ′ f i ′ J i ′′ +  J i ′  ∑ 
j=1
n
 f j ′( J j ′)  J j ′′ +  J i ′′  ∑ 
j=1 
n
  f j ( J j ′) . 
We can view this as a linear system for the vector  J″ with entries  J i ′′ , which can be 
written as  MJ″ = rJ ′, where  J′ denotes the vector with entries  J i ′, and the  i -th row 
of matrix  M is
  ( J i ′  f 1 ( J 1 ′ ) ,  .. ,   J i ′  f i−1 ( J i−1 ′ ) ,   ∑ j=1
n
 f j ( J j ′) ,   J i ′  f i+1 ( J i+1 ′ ) ,  .. ,   J i ′  f n ( J n ′ ) ) . 
Using the main result of Kaykobad (1985), a sufficient condition for  J″ to have all 
strictly positive entries is that  J ′ has all strictly positive entries and
  ∑ 
j=1
n
  f j ( J j ′) >  ∑ 
j≠i
J j ′ f j ′( J j ′) , 
which holds if  f j (x) ≥ x f j ′(x) for all  x ≥ 0 and  j . By noting that this condition is 
always satisfied (see footnote 20 for details), the proof is complete. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2: 
To study the existence of a solution, we proceed as in Proposition 1. First, we 
write the system of ODE’s (7) in the form
  r s 
–(q) = G ( s –′ (q) ) 
for an appropriate function  G . As in the MPE case, we can show that  G (x) has a 
continuously differentiable and strictly increasing inverse function  F (y) , for  y > 0 . 
Thus,  s 
–
is twice differentiable and convex, and the rest of the proof is similar to the 
proof of Proposition 1, and we omit the details. ∎
PROOF OF REMARK 1: 
Let  s 
–
n (q) denote the social planner’s value function when the group comprises of 
n symmetric agents, and observe that  s 
–
n (q) is nondecreasing in  n . That is because the 
social planner can always instruct the additional agent(s) to exert zero effort without 
decreasing her payoff. Then, it follows from (7) that  G ( s –n ′ (q) ) also increases in  n , 
where
  G (x) = n [ f  (x) x − c ( f  (x) ) ] . 
Now consider the change of variables
  y = nf  (x) so that x = c′ ( y _n) , 
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and the function
  G ̃ (y) = y c ′ ( y _n) − nc ( y _n) . 
Observe that  G ̃ ′ (y) =  c ′ ( y _n) +  y _n c″ ( y _n) − c′ ( y _n) =  y _nc″ ( y _n) > 0 , so  G ̃ (y) is increas-
ing in  y = n f  (x) . To show that  n (f  ( s –n ′ (q) ) ) increases in  n for all  q , suppose that 
the contrary is true, i.e., that there exists some  q for which  n ( f ( s –n ′ (q) ) ) decreases 
in  n . Then  G ̃ (n ( f ( s –n ′ (q) ) ) ) must also decrease in  n . However, this is a contradic-
tion , because  G ̃ (n ( f ( s –n ′ (q) ) ) ) =  s –n (q) . Therefore,  q t =  ∫ 0 tn ( f ( s –n ′ ( q s ) ) ) ds also 
increases in  n , which in turn implies that the completion time  τ – decreases in  n . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 3: 
Fix an arbitrary  q and  i . Note that the function
  G i (x) = x f i (x) −  c i ( f i (x) ) 
is strictly increasing in  x > 0 . To show that the efficient effort is higher than the 
minimal MPE effort, let  k be the index  j for which  J j ′(q) is the lowest. We have, from 
HJB equations (4) and (7),
  r [ s –(q) −  J k (q) ] ≤  ∑ 
j≠k[  f j ( s –′ (q) )  s –′ (q) −  f j ( J k ′ (q) )  J k ′ (q) −  c j ( f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) ] 
 +  G k ( s –′ (q) ) −  G k ( J k ′ (q) ) . 
Thus, if  s 
–′ (q) <  J k ′ (q) , then we would also have  s –(q) < J k (q) , which is 
impossible, because  s 
–(q) is the optimal social welfare. Therefore,  s –′ (q) ≥  J k ′  (q) , and hence  a –k (q) ≥  a k (q) for all  q . Therefore, if the agents are symmetric (i.e., 
 α i =  α j and  c i (a) =  c j (a) for all  i ,  j , and  a ), then  s –′ (q) ≥  J i ′(q) , and hence  a –i (q) ≥  a i (q) for all  i and  q . ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 4: 
Since we have
  c i ′(  f i ( J i ′(q)) =  J i ′(q) and q′ =  ∑ 
j
  f j (q) 
we get
  d _ 
dt
e −rt c i ′( f i ( J i ′( q t )) =  e −rt [− r J i ′( q t ) +  J i ″ (q) ∑ j f j ( q t )] .
On the other hand, differentiating the ODE for  J i we obtain
  r J i ′ =  J i ′  ∑ 
j≠i
n
 f j ′( J j ′)  J j ′′ +  J i ′′  ∑ 
j=1
n
 f j ( J j ′) . 
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Thus, we have
  d _ 
dt
e −rt c i ′(  f i ( J i ′( q t )) = − e −rt J i ′( q t ) ∑ 
j≠i
n
 f j ′( J j ′( q t )  J j ′′ ( q t ) .
From Proposition 1, we know that this is strictly negative. Similarly, differentiating 
the ODE for the social planner’s value function  s 
–
, we get
  r s 
–′ =  s –′′  ∑ 
j=1
n
 f j ( s –′) ,
which implies
  d _ 
dt
e −rt c i ′( f i ( s –′ ( q t ) ) ) = 0. ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 1: 
To establish existence of an MPE that implements the efficient outcome, substi-
tute (9) into (8) and take agent  i ’s first-order condition. This yields the system of 
ODE
  r J ˆi (q) = − c i ( f i ( J ˆ i ′(q) ) ) +  [  ∑ j=1
n
  f j ( J ˆ i ′(q) ) ]  J ˆ i ′(q) −  ∑ j≠ic j ( f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) 
 =  [  ∑ j=1
n
 f j ( J ˆ i ′(q) ) ]  J ˆ i ′(q) −  ∑ j=1
n
 c j ( f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) 
subject to  J ˆi (Q) = v . It follows from (7) that  J ˆi (q) = s (q) satisfies this 
ODE for all  i and  q ∈ [0, Q] . Because the planner’s problem has a unique 
solution (by Proposition 2), it follows that this is the unique project-completing 
MPE. 
Part (ii) of Lemma 1 follows by noting that  f i (·) is increasing for all  i ,  s –′ (q) > 0 
and  s 
–′′ (q) > 0 for all  q >  q _ s , and so that  h i ′(q) =  s –′ (q)  s –′′ (q)  ∑ j≠i   f j ′( s –′ (q) ) > 0 . ∎
PROOF OF LEMMA 2:
Noting that the balance in the savings account evolves according to  d H t 
=  [r H t +  ∑ j=1 n h j ( q t ) ] dt , each agent  i ’s problem is
  r J i (q, H)  =   max  a i    {− c i ( a i )  +   (  ∑ j=1
n
  a j )  J i (q, H)  _∂q  +   (rH  +   ∑ j=1
n
 h j )   J i (q, H)  _∂H  −   h i (q) } 
subject to the boundary condition
  J i (Q, H) =  β i (v + H) .
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Note that here, each agent’s discounted payoff function  J i is a function of both 
the state of the project  q and the balance in the savings account  H . We conjecture 
that  J i is of the form
  J i (q, H) =  β i H +  J ̃i (q) ,
in which case the HJB equation for  J ̃i (q) can be rewritten as
  r J ̃i (q) =  max  a i    {− c i ( a i ) +  ( ∑  j=1
n
 a j )  J ̃i ′(q) −  [ h i (q) −  β i  ∑ j=1
n
 h j (q) ] } 
subject to
  J ̃i (Q) =  β i v .
The first-order condition gives  a i (q) =  f i ( J ̃i ′(q) ) so that
(23)  r J ̃i (q) = − c i ( f i ( J ̃i ′(q) ) ) +  [  ∑ j=1
n
 f j ( J ̃j ′(q) ) ]  J ̃i ′(q) −  [ h i (q) −  β i  ∑ j=1
n
 h j (q) ] . 
As before, this ODE system has a unique solution, and it is straightforward to verify 
that  β i H +  J ̃i solves the HJB equation for  J i (q, H) . Hence, the conjecture has been 
justified. Notice that from (23) that  J ̃i (·) corresponds to the value function of agent 
i who receives  β i v upon completion of the project and makes flow payments  h ̃i (q) 
=  h i (q) −  β i ∑ j=1 n h j (q) . These flow payments add up to zero, and the proposition 
is proved. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 5: 
Let  J 
–
 j (q) denote agent  j ’s discounted payoff function for the problem in 
which each agent  j plays the efficient strategy  a –j (q) , he makes flow payments 
 h j (q) =  ∑ j≠i   c j ( f j ( s –′ (q) ) ) + r p j , and receives  v −  p j upon completion, where 
 ∑ j=1 n p j =  (n − 1)  s –(0) . Fix an agent  i , and assume that every agent  j ≠ i plays 
 a –j (q) =  f j ( s ′ (q) ) . Moreover, let  β i =  v −  p i   _____________ v+ (n − 1)  [v −  s –(0) ] . We have, for any effort  a i (q) process of agent  i , with  τ a denoting the corresponding completion time,
  e −r τ  a  min   
 {v −  p i ,   β i (v +  H τ ) } −  ∫ u τ a  e −rs { h i ( q s ) +  c i ( a i ( q s ) ) } ds
 ≤  e −r τ  a  (v −  p i ) −  ∫ u τ a  e −rs { h i ( q s ) +  c i ( a i ( q s ) ) } ds
 ≤  e −ru J – i ( q u ) ,
where the last inequality holds because  J 
–
 i is the value function of the prob-
lem with the final payment  J 
–
 i (τ) = v −  p i . In particular, with  u = t , we see 
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that  J 
–
 i ( q t ) is an upper bound also for agent  i ’s problem with the final payment 
 min {v −  p i ,   β i (v +  H τ ) } . On the other hand, with  a i (q) =  a –i (q) for all  q , all 
the inequalities above become equalities, so it is optimal for agent  i to choose 
strategy  a –i (q) also in the game with the final payment  min {v −  p i ,   β i (v +  H τ ) } . 
We see that this is also true starting from any point in time  t ≤ u ≤ τ , thus all play-
ing  a –i (q) is an MPE. In the above argument we implicitly assumed that  τ a is finite. If τ a is infinite, agent  i ’s value function is negative, thus inferior to  J – (q) .
Since each agent’s reward is capped by  β i (v +  H τ ) , the mechanism will never 
result in a budget deficit. Moreover, since on the equilibrium path each agent 
i collects  v −  p i upon completion, and the  p i s are chosen so that the the budget 
is  balanced, part (ii) follows. Part (iii) follows directly from the construction in 
Section IIIA. ∎
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 7: 
Suppose first that each agent  i receives zero if he runs out of cash before the proj-
ect is completed, and otherwise he gets exactly  v upon completion. Then, the ODE 
system looks the same as before, except  h i (q) in the ODE is multiplied by  i i (q) and 
v in the terminal condition is multiplied by  i i (Q) . The efficient outcome is still an 
MPE, because with the corresponding choice of effort,  i i (q) = 1 for all  i and all 
q ≤ Q , and the system of ODE is the same as before. 
Suppose now that each agent  i is promised  min {v,  v+ H τ  _n } instead of  v at comple-
tion, and zero if he runs out of cash. Then, the agent’s payoff is equal to
  i i (Q)  e −rτ min   
 {v −  p i ,   β i (v +  H τ ) } −  ∫ 0 τ  e −rs { i i ( q s )  h i ( q s ) + c i ( a i ( q s ) ) } ds
 ≤  i i (Q)  e −rτ (v −  p i ) −  ∫ 0 τ  e −rs { i i ( q s )  h i ( q s ) +  c i ( a i ( q s ) ) } ds .
Consider first the deviations in which the agent does not run out of cash by com-
pletion. Then, as before, with  J 
–
 i (q) denoting agent  i ’s value function in the efficient 
MPE, the last term is no greater than  J 
–
 i (0) , and hence the agent would not deviate if 
no one else does. If the agent applies a deviation in which he runs out of cash, then 
his value function is negative, and the same conclusion holds. ∎
PROOF OF COROLLARY 1:
We first show that  g ˆ i (τ) is nonincreasing in  τ . For all  τ such that  g i (τ) ≤ 
α i v ≤ v , because  ∑ j≠i   c j ( f j ( s –′ (Q) ) ) > 0 for all  i , it follows from (14) that 
g i ′(τ) < 0 , and so  g ˆ i ′(τ) ≤ 0 . On the other hand, for  τ such that  g i (τ) >  α i v , we have 
g ˆ i (τ) = α i v and so it is independent of  τ . From this it follows that for  τ <  τ –, we 
have  g i (τ) >  α i v . Because, if we had  g i (τ) ≤  α i v for some  τ <  τ –, then,  g i (·) would 
be strictly decreasing on  s > τ , and we could not have  g i ( τ –) =  α i v .
Next, let  J 
–
 i (t, q) denote agent  i ’s discounted payoff function corresponding to 
the game in which each agent  i pays  h i (t, q) and receives  g i (τ) at completion time  τ , 
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and agents  j ≠ i play the first-best strategies. Then, by the arguments in Section IV, 
agent  i also plays first-best strategy  a i (t, q) =  s –′ (q) . 
We aim to show that if each agent makes flow payments  h ˆ i (t, q) =  [ h i (t, q) ] + and 
receives  g ˆ i (τ) =  [min { α i v,   g i (τ) } ] + upon completion of the project, and all agents 
except for  i play first-best strategies, then agent  i cannot do better than playing first 
best himself. There are three cases to consider:
 (i) If the effort process  a i (t, q) of agent  i does not lead to completion, then he 
has to pay nonnegative payments forever but will never receive a lump-sum 
reward, which is worse than playing first best.
 (ii) Similarly, playing  a i (t, q) such that the corresponding completion time  τ a is 
larger than or equal to  τ i 0 , where  τ i 0 = min {τ :  g i (τ) = 0} , is worse than 
first best, because he gets zero reward upon completion.
 (iii) Suppose now he plays  a i (t, q) such that the corresponding completion time  τ a 
is less than  τ i 0 . Then, for  τ <  τ i 0 , we have  g ˆ i (τ) = min { α i v,  g i (τ) } and the 
discounted payoff satisfies
  e −r τ  a  g ˆ i ( τ a ) −  ∫ t  τ a   e −rs { h + (s,  q s ) +  c i ( a i (s,  q s ) ) } ds
   ≤  e −r τ  a  g i ( τ a ) −  ∫ t  τ a   e −rs { h i (s,  q s ) +  c i ( a i ( q s ) ) } ds
   ≤  e −rt J – i (t,  q t ) ,
where the last equality holds because  J 
–
 i is the value function of the problem of 
maximizing the expression in the second line. In particular, with  t = 0 , we see 
that  J 
–
 i (0, 0) is an upper bound for agent  i ’s payoff. Moreover, with all other agents 
playing the first-best strategy, if agent  i also plays first best, we have  τ a =  τ –,  g i ( τ –) =  g ˆ i ( τ –) = α i v ,  h i ≡  h ˆ i ≡ 0 , and all the inequalities above become equalities, so it 
is optimal for agent  i to also choose first-best strategy  s 
–′ (q) . 
Altogether, we see that under the mechanism  { g ˆ ,   h ˆ } playing first best is an MPE, 
in which case the budget is balanced on the equilibrium path, and there is no budget 
deficit even off equilibrium path. ∎
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